Borrowing to save? Can NHS bodies ease financial pressures by terminating PFI contracts? by Hellowell, Mark
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Borrowing to save? Can NHS bodies ease financial pressures by
terminating PFI contracts?
Citation for published version:
Hellowell, M 2015, 'Borrowing to save? Can NHS bodies ease financial pressures by terminating PFI
contracts?' BMJ. DOI: 10.1136/bmj.h4030
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1136/bmj.h4030
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Published In:
BMJ
Publisher Rights Statement:
© BMJ Publishing Group Ltd 2015
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
Borrowing to save: can NHS bodies ease financial
pressures by terminating PFI contracts?
Mark Hellowell describes the first buyout of a PFI contract by an NHS foundation trust and explores
whether other NHS bodies might be able to do the same
Mark Hellowell senior lecturer
Global Public Health Unit, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh EH8 9LD, UK
Public spending on the NHS is due to fall as a proportion of
gross domestic product, from a peak of 8% in 2009-10 to just
over 6% in 2020-21.1 The proportion of NHS and foundation
trusts in deficit rose from 10% in 2012-13 to 26% in 2013-14,
highlighting the scale of the financial challenges facing NHS
organisations.2 The payments that trusts are obliged to make
under private finance initiative (PFI) deals are a source of
budgetary pressure.2 By March 2013 a total of 121 PFI deals
had been procured byNHS bodies in England, with an aggregate
capital value of £11.8bn ($18.3bn; €16.6bn) and a projected
cash cost to the NHS of £81.5bn, £70.1bn of which remained
outstanding at that date.3 Two thirds of trusts with a deficit
greater than £25m have a PFI deal.2
Numerous calls have been made for PFI contracts to be
renegotiated.4 Although there is limited scope to reduce the
payments to PFI consortiums, NHS bodies normally have the
right to terminate them for a price. Interest in the termination
approach has grown among NHS bodies after the decision by
Northumbria Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust to borrow
money from a local county council to buy out the PFI contract
for Hexham General Hospital. The termination was completed
in October 2014, at which point the PFI was costing the trust
approximately £8m a year and had a further 18.5 years left to
run.3
Before the trust could proceed it had to demonstrate that the
long term cost to the public sector of terminating the PFI
contract would be lower than that of continuing with it. The
trust appointed the consultancy Deloitte to make this
comparison. Under the Freedom of Information Act, I accessed
Deloitte’s assessment and the correspondence (between the
trust, the Treasury, and the Department of Health) relating to it
(box). Here, I draw on these documents to evaluate the long
term costs of terminating the Hexham PFI deal. I then assess
the extent to which the termination approach can provide other
NHS bodies with an efficient means of lowering their costs.
Costs and benefits of termination
The fee paid by the trust to the consortium to terminate the
contract had to cover both the costs of ending the consortium’s
financial and contractual commitments and the market value of
its equity stake in the project. It was also subject to corporation
tax, and the consortium was entitled to compensation for this
from the trust.
Deloitte’s analysis showed that in April 2013 the trust estimated
that the fee would be £107.2m (table 1⇓). In the event, the trust
had to pay £114.2m to bring the contract to an end.5
To help the trust weigh up their options, Deloitte estimated the
cash costs of two outcomes: terminating or continuing the PFI
contract (table 2⇓). The comparison covered a 25 year
period—from October 2014 to September 2038—in which the
trust was due to repay the loan from the local county council.
Prior to its termination, the PFI contract had been due to end in
April 2033.
Repayment of the £114.2m loan at the fixed interest rate of
3.98% accounted for most of the estimated cost of termination
(£180.46m). In addition, the trust would pay for maintenance
and ancillary services that were provided by the consortium
under the PFI contract but would become the responsibility of
the trust after termination. These costs were estimated by the
trust to be £1.14m a year, which over 25 years would total
£36.58m, assuming that they were to rise at the Bank of
England’s consumer price index inflation target of 2% a year.
Thus the total cost of terminating the contract was estimated to
be £217.04m.
The majority of the cost of continuing with the contract
comprised payments to the consortium. These payments were,
like most PFI contracts, linked to the retail price index, which
tends to be higher than other inflation measures, including the
consumer price index.2 Assuming retail price index inflation of
3.68% a year over the period to April 2033, the total cash cost
of the payments to the consortium would be £222.5m. Under
this option, the trust would incur operating expenses after the
contract ended until the end of the comparison period. If these
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Key documents used in this analysis
Freedom of Information Act: Department of Health internal review case reference IR719074, Northumbria Foundation Trust PFI analysis,
23 October 2014.
Deloitte’s analysis: Northumbria NHS Foundation Trust: Hexham PFI termination value for money assessment, 19 April 2013.
Letter from the head of procurement, investment and commercial division to the permanent secretary. Department of Health. 28 August
2013.
HM Treasury draft report on Northumbria PFI termination: for DH comments, 2013.
expenses were to rise at the forecast consumer price index, the
associated costs would be £8.8m. Thus the total cost of
continuing the contract was estimated to be £231.35m, and
termination would reduce costs by approximately £14.3m.
However, this estimate is sensitive to variation between expected
and actual inflation. If operating expenses were to rise at a higher
rate than forecast (and inflation measured by the retail price
index was unchanged), the estimated saving would be reduced.
The saving would also be reduced if inflation measured by the
retail price index was lower than forecast (and inflation
measured by consumer price index was unchanged).
In addition to this estimated cash saving, the termination also
resulted in changes to the trust’s balance sheet that reduce its
annual expenditure. Trusts have to pay a “dividend” to the
Department of Health based on 3.5% of the value of their net
assets—that is, the value of their assets, such as property, minus
the value of their liabilities, or debts. As of April 2013, it was
expected that the termination fee, less the outstanding debt on
the PFI contract, would generate an operating expense for the
trust of £52.8m, leading to a deficit of £51.9m. This reduces the
value of the trust’s net assets and thus the dividends payable to
the department.
However, from the perspective of the public sector as a whole,
there is no saving—only a change in the allocation of resources
between the trust and the department, as detailed in the letter
from the department of health to the permanent secretary. For
that reason, the trust conducted the balance sheet impact
separately from the value for money comparison (which focuses
on relative costs from the perspective of the public sector as a
whole) on its finances in April 2013. Although the details of
the analysis are not available, Deloitte drew on this to calculate
an associated saving to the trust of £10.2m from April 2014 to
September 2033 in net present value terms. As noted, this
reduction in the dividend represents a saving for the trust but
an equivalent cost for the Department of Health.
Lessons for the NHS
It is striking that, having paid £67m over 10 years for the use
of a hospital with a capital value of £54m,3 the trust had to make
a further payment of £114.2m to bring the contract to an end.
Despite this, the trust still predicted it could save approximately
£14.3 million over 25 years by terminating the contract, mostly
due to lower capital and operating expenses. Other NHS bodies
are likely to want to replicate such an approach to easing their
financial pressures. How feasible is this?
Clearly, Whitehall cannot easily prevent future terminations on
financial grounds—at least in the case of foundation trusts,
which are semi-independent from the Department of Health.
The letter from the department to the permanent secretary
indicates that civil servants thought the Hexham example could
be repeated by other NHS bodies, with “unbudgeted financial
consequences for the departmental and national accounts.”
Treasury officials, though, noted in their draft report that “under
the current legislative framework, we cannot see how the trust
can be prevented from incurring this expenditure on affordability
grounds.”
Obstacles to termination
Yet there are a number of potential obstacles for trusts that
would like to follow this example. Firstly, only a small number
of foundation trusts have the finances to fund the large amounts
required to terminate a PFI deal.2Monitor, the financial regulator
of the NHS, reviewed the effect of the Hexham termination on
the ratio between the trust’s available income and annual
payments due on its debts and agreed that it would not affect
financial risk.3
Some other foundation trusts, such as Northumberland, Tyne
and Wear, and Oxleas, which have robust finances and PFI
contracts at a mature stage of operation,2might receive approval
from their financial regulator, Monitor, on similar grounds.
Trusts with the largest deficits, however, for whom the savings
associated with termination are most important, are the least
able to pursue this option.
Secondly, the Hexham termination was possible only because
of a local county council’s willingness and ability to provide a
loan. In so doing it reduced its ability to borrow for its own
capital requirements and exposed itself to considerable financial
risk. Given the tight financial constraints faced by local
authorities in the coming years, few trusts are likely to have this
option.
Thirdly, the termination fee may be so high that any savings
would be negligible or even non-existent. Most PFI deals in the
NHS have long term financing agreements because consortiums
need to be insulated against changes in interest rates. For many
contracts the cost of finance was fixed when interest rates were
considerably higher than they are today.
The fees associated with debt repayment or breakage (or both)
may lead to a termination sum that exceeds, by a considerable
margin, the outstanding PFI liability.6 For example, the
consortium that holds the Barts Health NHS Trust PFI contract,
which has a capital value of £1.1bn, has the third highest debt
of any PFI consortium in the UK, at £1.3bn.2 The consortium
that operates the Peterborough and Stamford Foundation Trust’s
PFI contract has the third largest interest rate swap liability in
the public sector, at £79m.2 For these two trusts—which also
recorded the largest deficits among all NHS and foundation
trusts in 2013-14—securing financing on such a scale may not
be financially feasible.2
Future options
If contract termination is not the answer to ending the financial
pressures created by PFI schemes, then what is? Given the scale
of the situation, it is incumbent on policy makers to carefully
consider the alternatives.
The simplest and most effective response is to adjust the
payments made to trusts by commissioners to ensure that they
are adequately compensated for their costs, including capital
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costs. All else being equal, these costs are likely to be higher
for trusts with operational PFI contracts than for other trusts.
The financial pressures created by PFI contracts are
disproportionate to their aggregate cost (£1.95bn per annum,
less than 2% of the NHS budget2), and this is because the burden
is concentrated among a minority of trusts.
Since 1994 private finance has been the only option for new
hospitals, and this continues to be the case under the
government’s “Private Finance 2” scheme.7 Although mistakes
were made by individual trusts in the commissioning of large
scale PFI projects, most of them had no choice but to use PFI
for what were widely recognised as non-discretionary
investments. In this context, failing to reimburse trusts for their
capital costs seems inequitable, and in an era of unprecedented
spending controls this has the potential to compromise patient
care.4
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Key messages
The first large scale termination of a PFI contract was achieved by Northumbria Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust for Hexham General
Hospital
Having already paid £67m over 10 years for the use of a hospital with a capital value of £54m, further payments of £114.2m were made
to bring the PFI contract to an end. The trust expects the termination to secure appreciable long term savings
As terminations are likely to require large additional expenditures in the short term, trusts under the most serious financial pressures
are the least likely to undertake this approach
Dealing with the problem of PFI payments is likely to need a coordinated response from central government to ensure that trusts are
reimbursed for their related costs
Tables
Table 1| The trust’s estimate of the termination fee6
Estimate (£m)Component
50Senior debt repayment
1.8Mezzanine debt repayment
27Interest rate and retail price index swap breakage
0.2Sub-contract breakage
(5.5)Cash balances
14.5Market value of equity
1.0Transaction costs
18.2Corporation tax gross-up
107.2Total
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Table 2| Cost comparison of terminating and continuing the PFI contract6
Estimate (£m)Cost components for each option
Terminating the PFI contract
180.46Cash cost of local authority loan repayments from October 2014 to September 2038
36.58Estimated cash cost of operating expenses from October 2014 to September 2038
217.04Total
Continuing the PFI contract
222.5Cash cost of PFI fees, October 2014 to April 2033
8.8Estimated cash cost of operating expenses, April 2033 to September 2038
231.35Total
14.3Cost saving of termination
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